



MERS-questions of public health importance:

The "known unknowns"



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


MERS CoV: Geographic virus distribution i MERS-CoV active Why no zoonotic **MERS** disease in Africa? 77% of global dromedary population

Reusken et al EID 2014; Perera et al EID 2013; Hemida et al 2014; Chan et al 2015; Miguel et al EID 2015; Miguel et al Eurosurveillance 2017; Chu et al Eurosurveillance 2015

Why "no" zoonotic MERS disease in Africa?

Hypotheses



So et al Eurosurveillance 2018 Abbad et al Eurosurveill 2019

Is human infection taking place in Africa?


Seroprevalence:

0.8% of 379 camel exposed humans (Nourlil et al. 2019)

Seroprevalence:

0% of 260 camel abattoir

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Seroprevalence:

- 0% of 760 camel exposed people (Munyua et al. 2017)
- General population:
 0.18% of 1222 (Liljander et al. 2016)
- Camel handlers: 4 (4.3%) of 93 (Kiyong et al. 2020)

RNA:

3 (1.2%) of camel exposed humans, concurrent with virus infection in camels (Ngere et al. 2022)

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Morocco Egypt

Seroconversion in RT-PCR confirmed mild of asymptomatic infection is poor (Choe et al. 2017; Zhao et al. 2017; Ko et al. 2017)

A THE WAY

MERS-CoV specific T cell responses may be detectable in infected sero-negative individuals in Saudi Arabia (Perlman et al. 2017)

enya

18 (30%) of 61 camel abattoir workers in Nigeria had MERS-CoV specific CD4+ or CD8+ T cell responses, even though they were MERS-CoV antibody negative. In comparison, none of control population had MERS-CoV specific T cell responses (Mok CKP.. Oladipo J, Kuranga S .. et al 2021)

Needs confirmatory studies

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
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
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
Phylogenetics of MERS coronaviruses




Compared with clade A & B MERS-CoV from Saudi Arabia, viruses from Africa (clade C) (Burkina, Ethiopia, Kenya, *Nigeria, Morocco*) have lower replication competence ex-vivo cultures of human lung (and Calu-3 cells).




Candy Zhou










Also for Nigerian, Moroccan and Egyptian isolates

Zhou et al PNAS 2021; 118(25):e2103984118.

Lower viral replication competence of MERS coronaviruses from Africa (Burkina, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt) in mouse model



Humanising exons 10-12 of mouse DPP4 provided by Stanley Perlman *Li K et al PNAS 2017*





Chris Mok




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
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What are implications for viral genetic diversity for infection in dromedary camels?


- Clade C: viral replication levels in naturally transmitted animals was lower. Transmission efficiency also lower (Rodon .. Segales et al EID 2023)
- Suggests that fitness in camels of clade B > clade C
- Explains why clade C virus does not get established in Arabian Peninsula in spite of repeated importations of dromedaries (and virus) from Africa.
- Danger: If Clade B virus gets introduced into Africa, it will potentially become dominant in Africa? → Implications for zoonotic potential?

Experimental infection and transmission clade B vs clade C virus in Llamas (a surrogate for camels)





Why "no" zoonotic MERS in Africa? Hypotheses





So et al Eurosurveillance 2018 Abbad et al Eurosurveill 2019

Viruses from Africa (clade C)

- Genetically distinct (Zhou et al 2021)
- Lower replication competence in human lung, possibly suggesting lower pathogenicity in humans (Zhou et al 2021).
- May partially explain why severe human disease is not prominent?
- But repeated exposure and unsuspected infection in large numbers of people may lead to virus adaptation to humans -> pandemic emergence.


Diverse genome deletions and insertions in MERS-CoV genomes in dromedary camels in Africa





- MERS-CoV in African camels genetically unstable (Zhou et al Emerging Microbes & Infections 2023)
- ORF8 deletion of SARS-CoV-1 was associated with the emergence of the SARS epidemic in 2003 (Guan et al 2003)


MERS CoV: Geographic virus distribution in camels



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
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
Human respiratory surveillance & Health care workers in Africa:

- How aware that MERS-CoV may be causing mild or severe respiratory disease in camel herding regions of East, West and North Africa?
- How many ILI/SARI surveillance sites are situated in proximity to camel exposed populations?
- How many ILI and SARI surveillance specimens in camel herding / exposed areas are being tested for MERS-CoV?

Summary of knowledge gaps

- Transmission within health care facilities can be efficient (more so that for avian flu H5N1, H7N9 etc.), but less efficient in the community? Can that change?
- Majority of MERS-CoV infected dromedaries are in Africa but no reported zoonotic disease there?
- Need more surveillance at the camel-human interface in <u>camel-herding</u> regions of Africa?
- Gaps in surveillance and sequence data from Central Asia
- Few recent MERS-CoV sequences in public databases
- MERS remains a pandemic threat and development of counter-measures are a priority





Thank you for your attention ... and to many research collaborators in Africa

Phenotypic and genetic characterization of MERS coronaviruses from Africa to understand their zoonotic potential

Ziqi Zhou^{a,1}, Kenrie P. Y. Hui^{a,1}, Ray T. Y. So^b, Huibin Lv^b, Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera^a, Daniel K. W. Chu^a, Esayas Gelaye^c, Harry Oyas^d, Obadiah Njagi^d, Takele Abayneh^c, Wilson Kuria^d, Elias Walelign^e, Rinah Wanglia^f, Ihab El Masry^g, Sophie Von Dobschuetz^g, Wantanee Kalpravidh^g, Véronique Chevalier^{h,i}, Eve Miguel^{j,k}, Ouafaa Fassi-Fihri^l, Amadou Trarore^m, Weiwen Liang^b, Yanqun Wangⁿ, John M. Nicholls^o, Jincun Zhaoⁿ, Michael C. W. Chan^a, Leo L. M. Poon^{a,b}, Chris Ka Pun Mok^{b,p,2}, and Malik Peiris^{a,b,2}

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Genetic diversity and molecular epidemiology of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus in dromedaries in Ethiopia, 2017–2020

Ziqi Zhou, Abraham Ali, Elias Walelign, Getnet F. Demissie, Ihab El Masry, Takele Abayneh, Belayneh Getachew, Pavithra Krishnan, Daisy Y.M. Ng, Emma Gardner, Yilma Makonnen, Eve Miguel, Véronique Chevalier, Daniel K. Chu, Ray T. Y. So, Sophie Von Dobschuetz, Gezahegne Mamo, Leo L. M. Poon & Malik Peiris

Emerging Microbes and Infections 2023

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